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WEBSTER 

WEBSTER  ON  THE 
CURRENCY 


o 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 
LOS  ANGELES 


WEBSTER   ON   THE   CURRENCY. 


^ 


THE  LIHKAI.'Y 
HWIVERSITV  or  <:/„V.:yORNIA 


LOS  ANGELES 


SPEECH 


OF 


/' 


HON.  DANIEL  WEBSTER, 


s 


AT  THE  MERCHANTS'  MEETING,  IN  WALL  STREET,  NEW  YORK, 
ON  MONDAY,  SEPTEMBER  28,  1840. 


REPORTED  IN  FULL  BY  ARTHUR  J.  STANSBURY. 


NEW    YORK: 


PUBLISHED  BY  E.  FRENCH,  No.  126  FULTON  STREET* 


1840. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1840,  by 

E.  FRENCH, 

in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York. 


w 


SPEECH. 


I  am  duly  sensible,  my  fellow-citizens,  both  of  the  honor,  and  of 
the  responsibility,  of  the  present  occasion;  an  honor  it  certainly  is, 
to  be  requested  to   address  a  body  of  Merchants,  such   as  I   behold 
before  me,  as  intelligent,  as   enterprising   and  respectable  as  any  in 
the    world.      A   responsible   undertaking   it  is,   to  address   such  an 
assembly,  and  on  a  subject  which  many   of  you  understand  scienti- 
fically, and  in  its  elements  at  least  as  well  as  I  do,  and  with  which  most 
of  you  have  more  or  less  of  practical  acquaintance.     The  currency 
of  a  country  is  a  subject   always   important,  and   in  some   measure 
complex  ;  but  it  has   become  the  great  leading  question  of  our  time. 
I  have  not  shrunk  from  the  expression  of  my  opinions,  since  I  have 
been  in  public  life,  nor  shall  1  now,  especially  since  on  this  question, 
another    great   political   question    seems    likely     to   turn,    viz.    the 
question  whether  one  Administration   is   about  to  go  out  of  power, 
and  another  Administration  to  come  into  power.     Under  this  state 
of  circumstances,  it  becomes  me  to  premise  what  I  have  now  to  say, 
by  remarking,  in  the  first  place,  that  I  propose  to  speak  for  nobody 
but   myself.     My  general  opinions   on  the  subject  of  the  currency 
have  been  well  known  ;  and  as  it   has  now  become  highly  probable 
that  those  who  have  opposed  all  that  has  recently  been  done  by  the 
government  on  that  subject,  will  be  called  on  to  propose  some  reme- 
dies of  their  own  for  the  existing  state  of  things,  it  is  the  more  incum- 
bent on  me  to  notify  to  all  who  hear  me,  that  what  I  now  say,  I  say  for 
myself  alone  ;  for,  in  regard   to  the   sentiments  of  the  distinguished 
individual  whom  it  is  your  purpose  to  support  as  a  candidate  for  the 
Presidency,  I   have  no  more   authority  to   speak  than  any  of  your- 
selves, nor   any  means  of  knowing   his   opinions   more  than  is  pos- 
sessed by  you,  and  by  all  the  country. 

I  will,  in  the  first  place,  state  a  few  general  propositions,  which  I  be- 
lieve to  be  founded  on  true  principles  of  good,  practical  political  econ- 
omy, as  understood  in  their  application  to  the  condition  of  a  country 
like  ours. 

9  2 


And  first  ;  I  hold  the  opinion,  that  a  mixed  currency,  com- 
posed partly  of  gold  and  silver,  and  partly  of  good  paper,  re- 
deemable, and  steadily  redeemed  in  specie,  on  demand,  is  the  most  use- 
ful and  convenient  for  such  a  country  as  that  we  inhabit,  and  is  sure 
to  continue  to  be  used,  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  in  these  United 
States;  the  idea  of  an  exclusive  metallic  currency  being  either  the 
mere  fancy  of  theorists,  or,  what  is  probably  more  true,  being  employ- 
ed as  a  means  of  popular  delusion. 

I  believe,  in  the  next  place,  that  the  management  of  a  mixed  cur- 
rency, such  as  I  have  mentioned,  has  its  difficulties,  and  requires  con- 
siderable skill  and  care  ;  and  this  position  is  as  true,  in  respect  to 
England,  the  greatest  commercial  country  of  Europe,  as  it  is  of  the 
United  States.  I  believe,  further,  that  there  is  danger  of  expan- 
sion and  of  contraction,  both  sudden  in  their  recurrence,  in  the  use 
of  such  a  currency — yet  I  believe,  that  where  a  currency  altogether 
metallic  exists,  as  it  does  in  Cuba,  and  in  other  countries  where 
metallic  coin  is  most  in  use,  as  in  France,  there  are  fluctuations  in 
prices,  there  are  disasters  and  commercial  failures,  occurring  per- 
haps nearly  as  often,  and  perhaps  as  bad  in  their  character,  as  in 
countries  where  a  well  regulated  paper  currency  exists. 

In  the  next  place,  I  hold  that  the  regulation  of  the  currency,  whe- 
ther metallic  or  paper — that  a  just  and  safe  supervision  over  that 
which  virtually  performs  the  office  of  money,  and  constitutes  the 
medium  of  exchange,  whatever  it  may  be — necessarily  pertains  to 
government — that  it  is  one  of  the  necessary  and  indispensable  pre- 
rogatives of  government. 

Every  Bank,  as   Banks  are  now  constituted  in  this  country,  per- 
forms two  distinct  offices  or  functions  :  first,   it  discounts  Bills  and 
Notes.      This  is  a  mere  matter  of  the  lending  of  money,  and  may  be 
performed   by    corporations,  or  by  individuals,    by  banks  without 
circulation,    acting   as   banks  of  discount  merely,  (although,  in  this 
country,  our  banks  are  all  banks  of  circulation,  issuing  paper  with  an 
express  view  to  circulation.)  When  such  a  bank  discounts  notes,  it  pays 
the  amount  of  discount  in  its  own  bills,  and  thereby  adds  so  much  to  the 
actual  amount  of  circulation,  every  such  operation  being,  by  so  much, 
an  increase  of  the  circulating  medium  of  the  country.      Hence  it  is 
true,  that  in  the  absence  of  all  government  control  and  supervision, 
the  wisdom  and  discretion  regulating  the  amount  of  money  afloat  at 
any  time  in  the  community,  is  but  the  aggregate  of  the  wisdom  and 
discretion  of  all  the  banks   collectively  considered  ;  each  individual 
bank  acting  from  the  promptings  of  its  own  interest,  without  concert 
with  others,  and  not  from  any  sense  of  public  duty.     In  my  judgment 
such  a  regulator,  or  such  a  mode  of  regulating  the  currency,  and  of 
deciding  what  shall  be  the  amount  of  money  at  any  time  existing  in 
the  community,  is  unsafe  and  untrustworthy,  and  is  one  to  which  we 


uovcr  can  look  to  guard  us  against  these  excessive  expansions  and 
contractions,  which  have  been  the  source  of  such  injurious  consequen- 
ces.— Hence  arises  my  view  of  the  duty  of  Government,  to  take  the 
care  and  control  of  the  issues  of  these  local  institutions,  and  thereby  to 
guard  the  community  against  the  evils  of  an  excessive  circulation. 
I  am  of  opinion,  that  the  government  may  establish  such  a  control  and 
supervision  as  shall  accomplish  these  purposes  in  two  ways  ;  and  first, 
by  restraining  the  issues  of  the  local  banks.  You  all  know,  and  from 
experience,  perfectly  well,  that  a  general  institution  for  the  circulation 
of  a  currency,  which  shall  be  as  good  in  one  part  of  the  country  as  in 
another,  if  it  shall  possess  a  competent  capital,  and  shall  be  empowered 
to  act  as  the  fiscal  agent  of  the  government,  is  capable  of  controlling 
excessive  issues,  and  keeping  the  bank  paper  in  circulation  in  a  com- 
munity within  reasonable  limits.  Such  an  institution  acts  beneficially, 
too,  by  supplying  a  currency  which  is  of  general  credit,  and  uni- 
form in  value  throughout  the  country. 

This  brings  us  to  the  point — what  we  need,  and  what  we  must 
have,  is  some  currency,  which  shall  be  equally  acceptable  in  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico,  in  the  Valley  of  the  Mississippi,  on  the  Canada  frontier, 
on  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  and  in  every  town,  village,  and  hamlet  of  our 
extended  land.  (Loud  cheering.)  The  question  is,  how  to  get  this  ? 
Now  it  seems  to  me  that  that  question  is  to  be  answered  by  a  plain 
reference  to  the  condition  of  the  country,  to  the  form  of  its  govern- 
ment, and  to  the  objects  for  which  the  general  government  was 
constituted.  Why  is  it  that  no  state  bank  paper,  however  secure,  un- 
der institutions  however  respectable,  in  cities  however  wealthy,  and 
with  a  capital  however  ample,  has  ever  succeeded,  but  has  uniformly 
failed  to  give  a  national  character  to  the  currency  %  The  cause  of 
this  is  obvious.  We  live  under  a  government  which  makes  us,  in 
many  important  respects,  one  people,  and  which  does  this,  and  was 
intended  to  do  it,  especially,  in  whatever  relates  to  the  commerce  of 
the  country.  Yet  the  nation  exists  in  twenty-six  distinct  and  sov- 
ereign states,  extending  over  a  space  as  wide  almost  as  the  greatest 
empires  of  Europe.  In  this  state  of  things  every  man  knows,  and  is 
bound  to  know,  two  governments  ;  first,  the  government  of  his  own 
state.  If  that  state  has  established  banks,  he  knows,  and  is  bound  to 
know,  on  what  principles  these  banks  have  been  established,  whether 
they  are  safe,  as  objects  of  credit,  and  whether  the  laws  of  their  adminis- 
tration are  wise.  Generally  speaking,  these  state  institutions — I  refer 
now  more  particularly  to  those  in  the  central,  and  in  the  northern  and 
eastern  sections  of  the  Union,  because  with  these  I  am  best  acquainted 
— enjoy  the  confidence  of  the  people  of  the  several  states  where  they 
exist.  Their  issues  are  in  general  well  received,  not  only  in  the 
states  where  the  banks  are  established,  but  frequently  also  in  the 
neighboring  states. — Every  citizen  is  also  bound,  in  like  manner,  to 


6 

know  the  laws  of  the  general  government,  the  security  of  the  in- 
stitutions it  has  founded,  and  their  general  character  ;  and  since  this 
is  a  national  subject,  over  which  the  general  government  net*  as 
such  he  regards  its  acts  and  provisions  as  of  a  national  character. 
Every  man  looks  to  institutions  founded  by  Congress,  as  emanating 
from  the  national  government,  a  government  which  he  knows,  and 
which,  to  a  certain  extent,  he  himself  influences,  by  the  exercise  of 
the  elective  franchise,  and  in  which  it  is  his  duty,  as  a  good  citizen, 
to  correct,  so  far  as  in  his  power,  whatever  may  be  amiss.  Me  has  con- 
fidence, therefore,  in  the  national  government,  and  in  the  institutions 
It  sanctions,  as  in  something  of  his  own  ;  but  the  case  is  very  differ- 
ent when  he  is  called  to  take  the  paper  of  banks  chartered  by  a  dis- 
tant state,  over  which  he  has  no  control — respecting  which  he  has 
little  personal  knowledge,  and  of  whose  institutions  he  knows  not 
whether  they  are  well  or  ill-founded,  or  well  or  ill  administered. 

In  exemplification  of  this,  if  you  take  a  note  of  one  of  the 
best  banks  in  the  city  of  New  York,  rich  as  this  city  is,  and 
place  upon  it  forty  indorsements  of  the  most  substantial  mercantile 
houses,  and  then  carry  that  note  to  the  frontier,  and  read  it  to  the 
people  there,  such  is  the  nature  of  man,  and  such  is  his  habit  of  look- 
ing to  the  nation  for  that  medium  which  is  to  circulate  through  the 
nation,  that  you  cannot  get  that  New  York  note,  with  all  its  indorse- 
ments, to  circulate  there  as  national  money.  Can  I  give  a  stronger 
proof  of  the  truth  of  this  assertion  than  is  found  in  a  fact  which  you 
all  know  ?  Your  city  banks  pay  specie  :  the  banks  of  Philadelphia 
and  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  do  not  pay  specie,  and  their  paper  is 
consequently  at  a  discount  here  of  three,  and  I  believe  of  five  per 
cent.  But  how  is  it  on  the  frontier  1  I  undertake  to  say  that  you 
may  go  to  Arkansas,  or  Missouri,  with  a  note  of  the  specie  paying 
banks  of  New  York,  and  with  another  of  the  non-specie  paying 
Bank  of  the  United  States,  and  the  latter  shall  be  preferred.  And 
why  1  because  it  is  in  the  name  of  its  national  predecessor.  There 
is  an  odour  of  nationality,  which  hangs  around  it,  and  clings  to  it,  and 
is  long  in  being  separated  from  it.     (Loud  cheering.) 

In  the  next  place,  my  opinion  is,  that  a  currency  emanating  partly 
from  a  national  authority  as  broad  in  its  origin  as  the  whole  country, 
and  partly  from  local  banks  organized  as  our  banks  now  are,  and  issu- 
ing paper  for  local  circulation,  is  a  better  currency  for  the  whole 
People  than  ever  before  existed  in  the  world.  Each  of  these  classes 
of  institutions,  and  each  of  these  kinds  of  currency,  has  its  own 
proper  use  and  value.  I  affirm  that  the  banking  institutions  of  New 
York  and  of  New  England,  are  organized  on  better  principles  than 
the  Joint  Stock  Companies  of  Great  Britain  ;  and  I  hold  that  we  are 
eompetent,  with  a  tolerable  intellect,  and  with  an  honest  purpose,  to 
establish  a  National  Institution,  which  shall  act  with  less  fluctuation 
than  is  experienced  in  England  under  the  Bank  of  England. 


Now,  gentlemen,  I  do  not  at  all  mean  to  say,  that  there  is  only 
one  mode,  or  two  modes,  of  accomplishing  this  great  national  ob- 
ject. I  do  not  say,  that  a  National  Bank  is  the  only  means  to  effect 
it  ;  but  in  my  judgment,  it  is  indisputably  true,  that  the  currency 
should,  in  some  degree,  or  in  some  portion  of  it,  be  nationalized  in 
its  character.  This  is  indispensable  to  the  great  ends  of  circulation 
and  of  business  in  these  United  States. 

But  I  shall  be  asked,  (and  it  is  a  pertinent  question,)  if  there  is  to 
be  a  National  Institution,  or  if  we  are  in  any  form  to  have  National 
issues  of  bank  paper,  what  security  is  there,  or  is  there  any  secu- 
rity, that  these  National  Institutions  shall  not  run  to  an  excess  in 
their  issues  of  paper  1  Who  is  to  guard  the  guardian  1  Who  is  to 
watch  the  sentinel  1  The  last  twenty  years  have  been  fruitful  in  ex- 
perience on  this  subject,  both  in  the  United  States  and  in  England. 
In  that  time  the  world  has  learnt  much.  I  may  say  that  we  have 
learnt  much  ;  for  our  own  experience  has  been  our  instructor  ;  and  I 
think  that  there  are  modes  by  which  banking  institutions  may  be  so 
far  restricted  as  to  give  us  reasonable  security  against  excessive 
issues. 

From  whatever  source  these  institutions  may  emanate,  the  first 
security  is  to  be  found  in  entire  publicity  as  to  the  amount  of  paper 
afloat.  There  is  more  in  this  than  is  sometimes  supposed.  It  should 
be  known  to  the  whole  community  from  day  to  day,  what  is  the  actual 
amount  of  paper  in  circulation.  When  prices  rise  or  fall,  a  mer- 
chant has  a  right  to  know,  whether  the  change  of  price  springs  from 
change  in  demand,  or  merely  from  change  in  the  amount  of  money 
in  circulation  5  and,  therefore,  the  first  duty  of  a  banking  institution 
is,  to  make  it  universally  known,  by  a  daily  or  a  weekly  publication, 
what  amount  of  paper  it  has  out.  See  what  benefits  would  arise 
from  such  an  arrangement,  and  that  in  a  thousand  ways.  If  the 
bank  should  thus  make  its  issues  public,  those  who  control  its  af- 
fairs would  be  bound  to  respect  public  opinion,  and  the  bank,  while 
it  controlled  what  is  under  it,  would  itself  be  controlled  by  some- 
thing above  it ;  and  thus  public  opinion  would  be  brought  to  regu- 
late the  Regulator,  and  to  watch  the  sentinel. 

Then,  again,  if  the  Government  should  act  in  this  matter,  what  it 
does  should  rather  be  done  in  reference  to  the  function  of  issue,  in 
such  an  institution,  than  with  a  view  to  make  it  a  money-getting 
concern  ;  and  that  no  temptation  should  lead  the  Bank  to  excess, 
there  ought  to  be  a  limit  to  the  extent  of  its  Dividends  :  all  receipts 
for  discount, beyond  that  point,  not  going  into  the  private  crib,  but 
into  the  public  treasury.  (Cheering,— and  a  strong  expression  of  ap- 
probation.) Then  there  is  another  error,  which  has  been  common 
with  the  Bank  of  England.  If  you  look  at  the  monthly  accounts 
which  it  has  published  of  its  affairs,  it  will  at  once  appear,  that  its 


Directors  seemed  to  have  judged  of  the  condition  of  the  institution 
by  the  amount  of  its  circulation,  compared  with  its  assets,  including 
securities,  as  well  as  bullion.  They  look  chiefly  to  the  amount 
payable,  and  the  amount  receivable.  As  a  mere  lender  of  money, 
this  is  all  very  well ;  but  if  the  Bank  is  to  act  in  regulating  the  circu- 
lation, it  is  an  incorrect  mode  of  stating  the  account:  but,  admitting  the 
object  to  be  to  keep  its  paper  redeemable,  and  to  exercise  a  general 
regulation,  the  true  point  of  examination  would  be  to  see  what  pro- 
portion exists  between  the  outstanding  paper,  and  the  in-lying  Bul- 
lion. The  Bank  may  be  very  rich,  but  she  may  expect  her  resources 
from  the  payment  of  the  securities  she  holds.  This  may  be  all  very 
well,  as  a  means  to  show  that  she  is  solvent,  but  it  is  not  the  inquiry 
that  belongs  to  her,  as  the  source  and  preserver  of  a  sound  circulat- 
ing medium. 

I  know  very  well  that  there  are  objections  to  the  fixing  of  a  positive 
limit  for  circulation.  But  until  such  limit  can  safely  be  dispensed  with,  it 
may  be  best  to  make  it  positive.  When  an  institution  has  acquired  gene- 
ral confidence,  and  there  is  no  danger  of  a  sudden  and  extensive  panic 
in  relation  to  it,  it  is  in  the  power  of  such  an  institution,  in  case  local 
panics  should  occur,  to  relieve  the  community,  by  that  vibration  in  the 
amount  of  outstanding  circulation,  which  discreet  men  may  be  trusted  to 
regulate.  Still  I  am  of  opinion,  that  there  ought  to  be  a  fixed  limit  from 
which  the  Bank  should  never  depart. 

Now,  I  have  not  said,  nor  do  I  mean  to  say,  that  one  or  the  other  mode 
of  accomplishing  this  great  and  desirable  object  is  indispensable,  but  I  af- 
firm, that  in  his  communication  to  Congress  vetoing  the  Bill  to  renew  the 
charter  of  the  United  States  Bank,  President  Jackson  did  say,  that  if  he 
were  applied  to,  he  could  furnish  a  plan  for  a  United  States  Bank,  which 
would  be  adequate  to  all  the  purposes  of  such  an  institution,  and  should  yet  be 
constitutional.  Therefore,  the  thing  is  practicable,  provided  we,  of  this 
generation,  can  accomplish  that  which  President  Jackson  said  he  could 
accomplish.     (Loud  laughter  and  cheers.) 

Now,  gentlemen,  I  have  only  stated  what  I  receive  as  general  princi- 
ples, which  the  experience  of  the  world  has  established  on  the  subject  of 
currency  and  a  paper  currency.  But  all  we  can  say  is,  that  it  seems  the 
existing  Administration  will  do  nothing  of  all  this,  which  I  have  stated 
as  necessary  to  be  done.  They  have  done  nothing  to  nationalize  the 
currency  in  any  degree  ;  and  so  long  as  the  government  holds  to  that 
determination,  there  never  will  be  in  this  country  a  currency  of  uniform 
value.  That  brings  me  to  this  inquiry.  Is  the  Administration  settled 
on  the  ground  it  has  repeatedly  avowed,  and  has  for  three  years  adhered 
to  in  practice,  never  to  give  us  this  uniform  currency  ?  That  is  the 
question.  The  Administration  will  not  go  back  to  the  policy  sanctioned 
by  forty  years  of  prosperity.  It  will  not  trust  the  State  Banks.  It  will  do 
nothing :  and  it  will  do  nothing  on  principle  :  for  Mr.  Van  Buren  holds,  that 


the  Constitution  gives  Congress  no  power  to  do  anything  in  the  matter. 
Now,  ]  said  at  the  time  this  assertion  was  uttered,  and  I  still  say,  that.  ! 
am  hardly  able  to  express  tke  astonishraenl  I  feel  at  what  would  scum 
the  presumptuouiness  of  such  a  position  :  because,  from  the  very  cradle 
of  the  government,  from  the  very  commencement  of  its  existence,  those 
men  who  made  the  Constitution,  who  recommended  it  to  the  People,  who 
procured  its  adoption,  and  who  then  undertook  its  administration,  all  ap- 
proved that  policy  which  is  thus  pronounced  unconstitutional.  It  was  fol- 
lowed for  forty  years  by  every  Congress,  ami  by  every  President,  and  its 
constitutionality  was  affirmed  and  sanctioned  l>y  the  highest  judicial 
tribunals.  \nd  yet  here  a  gentleman  stands  vu,  at  hall'  a  century's  dis- 
tance, and  disregarding  all  this  legislative, — executive  and  judicial 
authority,  says,  "  I  am  wiser  than  all  of  them,  and  I  aver  there  is  no 
such  power  in  the  Constitution." 

The  President  says,  ''  the  People  have  decided  this  :"  but  where  did 
they  so  decide,  and  when  ?  Why,  he  says,  that  General  Jackson  de- 
clared the  Bank  to  be  unconstitutional,  and  then  the  People  re-elected  him  : 
but  I  have  told  you  what  General  Jackson  did  declare.  He  said  that  a 
National  Bank  might  be  established,  which  would  not  be  unconstitutional: 
although  he  held  the  particular  Bank  then  in  existence  to  be  against  the 
Constitution.  Now,  if  the  People  re-elected  him  after  this  declaration, 
why  is  it  not  just  as  fair  to  infer  that  they  did  so  because  he  uttered  this 
opinion,  because  he  said  that  there  might  be  a  National  Bank,  and  the 
Constitution  still  be  preserved  inviolate  ?  No,  gentlemen,  the  truth  is, 
that  General  Jackson  was  re-elected,  not  because  he  vetoed  the  Bank  of 
the  United  States,  but  notwithstanding  he  vetoed  it.  (Cheers.)  It  was 
the  general  popularity  of  General  Jackson,  and  that  paramount  ascen- 
dency by  which  he  ruled  the  Party  that  placed  him  in  power,  and  made 
it  bend  and  bow  to  his  own  pleasure,  that  carried  him  again  into  office. 
To  say  that  the  constitutional  power  of  creating  a  National  Bank,  and 
regulating  the  national  currency,  was  repudiated  by  the  People,  is  a 
glaring  instance  of  false  reasoning  and  false  philosophy.  Nay,  the  Pre- 
sident goes  further,  and  says,  he  was  himself  against  the  Bank,  and  the 
People  elected  him  too  for  that  reason. — (loud  laughter.)  I  do  not  say 
what  actuated  the  People  in  his  election  ;  but  this  I  will  say,  that  if 
any  man  ever  came  into  office  by  virtue,  and  under  power  of  will  and 
testament,  it  is  that  same  gentleman. — (cheers.)  I  insist  that  no  evidence 
can  be  produced  that  the  American  People  have  ever  repudiated  the  doc- 
trines of  Washington,  and  condemned  and  rejected  the  decisions  of  their 
own  highest  Judicial  Tribunals. 

Now  we  must  decide  on  these  questions  as  men  having  a  deep  per- 
sonal interest  in  them.  Do  you  go  to  authority  ?  do  you  appeal  to 
Madison  ?  You  may  quote  Mr.  Madison's  opinion  from  morning  till  noon, 
and  from  noon  to  night  on  the  longest  day  in  summer,  and  you  cannot 
get  from  the  friends  of  the  Administration  one  particle  of  answer.     I 


It, 

have  again  and  again  read  in  my  place  in  the  Senate,  Mr.  Madison's 
doctrine,  that  it  is  the  duty  of  Government  to  establish  a  National  Cur- 
rency. I  have  shown  that  Mr.  Madison  urges  this,  with  the  utmost 
earnestness  and  solemnity.  They  say  nothing  against  it,  save  that  Mr. 
Van  Buren,  having  expressed  a  different  opinion,  got  in  at  the  last  elec- 
tion.    (Loud  laughter  and  cheering.) 

Now  when  the  National  Bank  was  destroyed,  or  rather  when  its 
charter  expired,  and  was  not  renewed,  in  consequence  of  the  Execu- 
tive Veto,  what  followed  X     I  say  that  the   government  then  put  the 
entire  business  of  this  country,    its  commercial,   its  manufacturing, 
its  shipping  interest,  its  fisheries — in  a  word,  all  that  the  people  pos- 
sessed, on  the  tenterhooks  of  experiment ;  it  put  to  the  stretch  every 
interest  of  the  nation  ;  it  held  them  up,   and  tried  curious  devices 
upon  them,  just  as  if  the  institutions  of  our  country  were  things  not 
to  be  cherished  and  fostered  with  the  most   solicitous  anxiety  and 
care,  but  matters  for  political  philosophers  to  try  experiments  upon. 
I  need  not  remind  you  that  General  Jackson  said  he  could  give  the 
country  a  better  currency — that  he  took  the  national  treasure  from 
where   it  had  been  deposited  by  Congress,  to  place  it  in  the  State 
Banks,  and  that  Congress,  by  subsequent   legislation,   legalized  the 
transfer,  under  the  assurance  that  it  would  work  well  for  the  coun- 
try.    Yet  I  may  be  permitted  to  remind  you,  that  there  were  some 
of  us,  who,  from  the  first,  declared  that  these  State  Banks  never  could 
perform  the  duties  of  a  national  institution ;  that    the    functions  of 
such  an  institution  were  beyond  their   scope,  without  the  range   of 
their  powers  ;  that  they  were,  after  all,  but  small  arms,  and  not  artil- 
lery, and  could  not  reach  an  object  so  distant.  The  State  Bank  system 
exploded  ;  but  the  Administration  did  not  expect  it  to  explode.     At 
that  day,  they  no   more   looked  to  the  Sub-Treasury  scheme,  than 
they  looked  for  an  eclipse,  (and  they  did  not  then  expect  an  eclipse 
half  as  much  as  they  t^o  just  now.)     [Laughter  and  cheers.]     When 
the  U.  S.  Bank  was  overthrown,  they  turned,  as  the  next  expedient, 
to  the  State  institutions  ;  and  they  had  full  confidence  in  them,  for 
confidence  is  a  quality   in  which  experimenters  are   seldom   found 
wanting,  but  the  expedient  failed — the  banks   exploded ;  and  what, 
then? 

Why,  in  the  speech  delivered  in  this  place,  by  one  of  the  ablest 
advocates  of  the  measures  of  the  Administration,  Mr.  Wright  said, 
what  could  you  expect  ?  what  could  Mr.  Van  Buren  do  1  He  could 
not  adopt  a  national  bank,  because  he  had  declared  himself  opposed 
to  it.  He  could  not  rely  on  the  state  banks,  for  they  had  crumbled 
to  pieces.  What  then  could  he  do,  but  recommend  the  Sub-Trea- 
sury 1  What  does  this  show,  but  that  the  government,  as  I  have 
said,  had  departed  from  the  principles  of  the  approved  policy  of  forty 
years  of  national  prosperity,  and  had  put  itself  in  such  a  situation  that 


11 


it  could  not  aid  the  country  in  any  way  1    Mr.  Van  Buren  would  not 
retract  his  opinion   against  the  bank,  (although  he  could  retract  his 
opinion  against  the  State  Bank  Deposit  System  fast  enough,)  but  he 
would  not  retract  the  position  he  had  taken  against  the  national  bank. 
The  state  banks  had  failed  him  ;  and  he  was  driven,  as  his  only  refuge, 
to  the  suggestion  of  withdrawing  all  care  over  the  national  currency 
from  the  national  government,  and  confining  the  solicitude  of  Govern- 
ment to  itself  alone.    But  how  fur  did  he  carry  this  doctrine  1  Look  at 
the  draft  of  the  first  Sub-treasury  bill.   Does  it  contain  a  specie  clause  ? 
No  such  thing  !  It  is  a  mere  regulator  of  the  revenue  on  the  principles 
of  the  Resolution  of  1816.    But  what  happened  next  %  This  Bill  was 
like  to  fail  in  the  Senate  for  want  of  votes. — There  was  a  certain 
division  in  that  body,  at  the  head  of  which  stood  Mr.  Calhoun,  whose 
aid  was  indispensable  to  carry  the  measure,  but  who  would  not  vote 
fotr  it,  unless  the  hard  money  clause  should  be  inserted.      It  was  in- 
serted accordingly  :  and  then  the  friends  of  the  Administration,  for 
the  first  time,  shouted  in  all  quarters,  "  Hard  Money  !"   "  Hard   Mo- 
ney !"  "  Hard  Money  !"     (Loud  Laughter.) 

By  this  hard  necessity,  the  Administration  was  driven  to  a  measure 
which  it  had  no  more  expected  than  you  expect  to  see  your  houses 
on  fire  to-night.  But  such  are  the  expedients,  the  miserable  expe- 
dients of  a  baffled  and  despairing  Administration,  on  which  they 
have  thrown  themselves  as  a  last  resort,  always  hoping,  and  always 
deceived,  and  plunging  deeper  and  deeper  at  every  new  effort. 
(Loud  and  prolonged  cheering.) 

I  have  said,  and  it  may  be  proper  enough,  and  involve  no  great 
self-complacency  to  say  it,  that  there  were  some  of  us  who  never 
ceased  to  warn  the  government  and  the  nation,  that  the  deposit 
system  must  explode,  as  it  has  exploded.  But  what  was  our  re- 
ward \  What  was  the  boon  conferred  upon  us,  for  thus  apprising 
the  administration  of  its  danger  1  We  were  denounced  as  enemies 
to  state  banks,  as  opposed  to  state  institutions,  as  anti-state-rights 
men,  whom  nothing  would  satisfy,  but  the  spectacle  of  a  great  na- 
tional institution,  riding  over  and  treading  down  the  institutions  of 
the  states. 

But  what  happened  1  The  whole  State  Bank  experiment,  as  I  have 
said,  utterly  failed  ;  and  what  did  gentlemen  of  the  administration  do 
then  1  They  instantly  turned  about,  and  with  the  utmost  outrage  of 
remark,  reviled  the  banks  which  their  experiment  had  crushed.  They 
were  vile,  corrupt,  faithless,  treacherous  institutions,  leagued  from  the 
very  beginning  with  the  opposition,  and  not  much  better  than  British 
Whigs  !  (Laughter.)  And  when  we,  who  had  opposed  the  placing  of 
the  national  treasure  in  these  banks,  declared  that  they  had  failed 
only  because  they  were  applied  to  a  purpose  for  which  they  never 
were  calculated,  and  had  perished  in  consequence  of  a  rash  and  un- 


12 

wise  experiment,  we  were  instantly  told,  "you  are  Bank  Aristocrats  J 
you  are  leagued  with  a  thousand  corrupt  banks,  and  are  seeking  by 
the  power  of  British  Gold  to  destroy  the  purest  Administration  that 
ever  breathed  the  air  of  Heaven!"  Thus,  when  we  said  that  State 
Banks,  though  good  for  some  purposes,  were  not  good  as  a  substitute 
for  a  National  Bank,  then  we  were  denounced  as  the  enemies  of 
banks;  but  when  we  wished  to  shield  these  same  banks  from  misap- 
plied censure,  and  protect  them  from  being  totally  destroyed  by 
acts  of  bankruptcy,  then  we  were  reviled  as  "  Bank  Aristocrats." 

Now  I  ask  you,  gentlemen,  as  Merchants,  what  confidence 
can  you  place  in  such  an  administration  ?  Do  you  see  any 
thing  that  they  are  disposed  to  do  to  restore  the  times  you  once 
enjoyed. — (Groans,  and  loud  cries  of  "  No,"  "  No.")  I  perceive  that 
your  opinion  corresponds  with  my  own,  and  that  you  cannot  lend 
your  support  to  men  who  turn  their  backs  on  the  experience,  the  in- 
terests, and  the  institutions  of  their  country,  and  who  openly  declare 
that  they  will  not  exercise  the  powers  which  have  been  conferred 
on  them  for  the  public  good.     (Cheers.) 

Now,  gentlemen,  I  will  observe  to  you  further,  that  it  appears  to 
me,  that  this  Administration  has  treated  the  States  in  reference  to 
their  own  affairs  just  as  it  has  treated  the  state  banks.  It  has  first 
involved  them  in  the  evils  of  extravagance,  (if  any  extravagance  ex- 
ists,)  and  has  then  abused  them  for  the  very  thing  to  which  its  own 
course  has  strongly  invited  them.  Commencing  with  the  Messages 
of  Mr.  Van  Buren  himself,  and  then  looking  at  the  reports  of  his  Sec- 
retaries, and  the  resolutions  and  speeches  of  Mr.  Benton  and  Mr.  Grun- 
dy, in  the  Senate,  and  at  the  outcry  of  the  whole  Administration 
press,  there  appears  to  be  a  systematic  attempt  to  depress  the  cha- 
racter and  credit  of  the  States.  It  is  everywhere  said,  that.  "  the 
States  have  been  rash  and  extravagant ;"  "  the  States  will  yet  have 
to  repent  of  their  railroads  and  canals,  and  projects  of  internal  im_ 
provements."  This  is  the  burthen  of  the  President's  Message,  of 
the  reports  of  his  secretaries,  and  the  resolutions  of  his  friends. 
Now  I  solemnly  ask,  is  not  the  tendency  of  such  a  course  of  mea- 
sures virtually  to  affect  the  credit  of  the  States  that  have  out-stand- 
inff  bonds  and  obligations  in  the  market  1 

Let  us  look  into  this  matter  a  little.  Let  us  see  under  what  cir- 
cumstances it  was  that  the  States  were  induced  to  contract  these 
large  debts  which  now  embarrass  them.  And  here  let  me  call  your 
attention  to  a  few  facts,  dates,  and  figures.  And  first,  I  now  here 
to-day,  in  your  presence,  charge  upon  the  Administration  of  the 
General  Government  those  great  expansions  of  paper  money,  and 
sudden  contractions,  both  of  which  have  so  deranged  our  affairs. 
I  propose  to  prove  the  charge  ;  and  with  that  view  now  proceed  to- 


13 

lay  before  you  facts,  and  dates,  and  transactions,  which  must  carry 
conviction  to  every  honest  and  candid  mind. 

Let  us  go  back  to  the  year  1832,  when  it  was  perfectly  settled  by 
the  veto  of  President    Jackson,  that  the   Bank  of  the  United  States 
would  not  be  rechartered.     Suppose   we  take  a  series  of  years  by 
tens,   and   trace    the    history    of    the    creation   of    State    Banks  in 
this   country.     From    1820    to    1830,  a  period   of  ten  years,  there 
were  created  in  the  United  States  twenty-two  new  banks,  and  their 
creation  added  to  the  banking  capital  of  the  country  but  eight  mil- 
lions of  dollars.     During  this  period,  the  Bank  of  the  United  States 
was  in  full  operation,   and   nobody   entertained  a  doubt  but  that  it 
would  be  continued.    How  was  it  in  the  next  ten  years  1  From  1830 
to  1810,  the  increase  of  banks,  instead  of  twenty-two,  as  in  the  preced- 
ing ten  years,  was  three  hundred  and  forty-eight  ;   and  the  increase 
of  banking  capital,  instead  of  eight  millions,  amounted  to  two  hun- 
dred and  sixty. eight  millions.     Such  has  been  the  progress  of  bank 
expansion  during  the  charming,  the  successful  years  of  the  experi- 
ment.    But  further;  not  only  was  there   this  great  augmentation  in 
the  number,  and   in  the  capital,  of  the  banks,  but  the  extraordinary 
proceeding  followed  of  the  removal  of  the  deposits  in  1833.     In  con- 
sequence of  this,  it  was  by  the  Government  declared  to  be  the  duty 
of  all  its  deposit  banks  to  lend  the  public  money  freely  to    the  com- 
mercial community.     The  Secretary  of  the   Treasury,  in    his  circu- 
lar, issued,  I  think,  in  September,    1833,  told  these   institutions  ex- 
pressly, that  it  was  their  duty  to  discount  freely,  and  laid  it  down  as 
a  maxim,  that  the  money  of  the  Government,  between  the  periods  of 
its  collection  and  disbursement,  ought  to  be  at  the  use  of  the  com- 
munity.    I  remember,  indeed,  to  have  heard  it  said  by  the   cashier 
of  one  of  the   banks  in  this  street,  that   "  he  hardly  knew  what    to 
do,  for  he  was   ordered  to  lend  more  of  the   public   money  than  he 
could  get   security  for."     [Laughter.]     It  is   from  this  increase  of 
banks,  and  this  increase  of  issues,  and   from  that  alone,  that  the  ex- 
pansion so  injurious  to  the  country  really  sprang. 

I  know  it  may  be  said  that  there  were  expansions  and  contractions 
during  the  existence  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  This  I  do  not 
deny.  The  administration  of  that  institution,  I  admit,  was  not  always 
perfect  ;  but  I  say,  taking  the  whole  period,  of  near  half  a  century, 
during  the  existence  of  such  a  bank,  the  country  was  freer  from 
violent  and  sudden  extremes  of  contraction  and  expansion  than 
it  has  ever  been  since  that  time.  Why  will  not  a  fair  reasoner  draw 
his  conclusions  from  the  entire  history  of  his  country  as  a  whole  1 
In  his  late  speech  from  this  place,  Mr.  Wright  said  he  would  not  look 
back  to  the  history  of  the  first  Bank  of  the  United  States  :  he  said, 
that  under  the  second  National  Bank,  there  were  great  evils, — but 
did  he  deny  that,  taking  the  whole  forty  ye^rs  together,  the  country 


14 

was  less  liable  to  fluctuations  than  it  has  since  been  %  Not  at  all. 
Well,  in  the  midst  of  this  great  expansion  of  banks  and  banking  capi- 
tal came  the  Specie  Circular,  whose  tendency  was  to  produce,  and 
which  did  in  fact  produce,  great  and  sudden  contractions.  This  vio- 
lent action  and  re-action,  superinduced  on  a  previous  state  of  pecu- 
niary expansion,  is  fairly  chargeable  to  the  Administration  itself,  and 
is  to  be  traced  to  the  action  of  the  Government,  more  than  to  all 
other  causes. 

But  to  return.  How  does  it  stand  with  respect  to  the  States  ?  Under 
what  patronage,  and  at  whose  recommendation,  did  they  contract  the 
larofe  and  onerous  debt  of  two  hundred  millions  of  dollars  1  Who 
induced  this  1  Under  what  circumstances  at  home  was  it  done'? 
From  1820  to  1825,  the  aggregate  of  State  Debts  amounted  to  twelve 
or  thirteen  millions.  From  1825  to  1830,  it  stood  at  thirteen  millions, 
— but  during  the  period  from  1830  to  1835,  it  rose  to  forty  millions. 
The  effect  of  the  increase  of  circulation  did  not  begin  fairly  to  deve- 
lope  itself  in  the  country  till  1834  and  1835.  Then  the  state  debts 
were  augmented  to  forty  millions,  and  between  1835  and  1840,  they 
rose  to  one  hundred  millions. 

It  appears  from  tables  supposed  to  be  accurately  compiled,  that  the 
amount  of  stock  issued  by  the  several  States,  for  each  period  of  five 
years,  since  1820,  is  as  follows,  viz  : — 

From    1820—1825  somewhat  over  12,000,000. 

1825—1830    "     "   13,000,000. 

1830—1835     "     "   40,000,000. 

1835—1840     "     "  109,000,000. 

Of  which  amount  of  one  hundred  and  nine  millions,  nearly  the  whole 

was  issued  during  1838  and  1836,  and  part  of  1837,    that   is   to    say, 

in  the  most  palmy  time  of  the  Experiment. 

So  it  appears  that  these  "extravagant"  state  debts  were  contracted 
when  the  currency  was  most  redundant :  when  the  States,  in  common 
with  all  the  country,  were  urged,  and  goaded,  and  lashed  on  to  bor- 
row :  and  when  all  sorts  of  extravagant  hopes  and  schemes  were  in- 
dulged among  the  people.     To  this  very  redundancy,  thus  caused  by 
the  government  itself,  in  the  vast  multiplication  of  banks,  and   the 
free   extension  of   loans,   are  to  be  traced  these  rash  engagements 
of  the  States,  for  which  they  have  been  reviled  in  all  quarters,  from 
the  head  of  the  Government  down  to  its  lowest  agency.     There  were 
one  hundred  millions  of  debts  created  in  1835  and  1836,  in  the  very 
midst  of  the  glow  and  flow  of  the  deposit   system.     It  was  in  these 
very  years,  distinguished,  as  the  Administration  say,  for  prudence 
and  public  prosperity,  that  the  creation  of  the  State  debts  kept  pace 
with  the  bank  creation  and  accommodation.     The  bank  creation  and 
accommodation  kept  pace  with  the  government  experiment,  and  the 
government  experiment   kept   pace  with    the  most   rapid  delusion 


15 

which  ever  characterized  any  administration  upon  earth,  or  ever 
carried  away  an  intelligent  people.     (Loud  cheers.) 

And  now  I  am  on  this  subject,  I  must  say  a  word  or  two  on  another 
topic  which  it  naturally  suggests.      One  of  the  charges  of  the  day  is, 
that  the  opposition  to  the  Administration  has  come   out   with  a  pro- 
ject for  the  assumption  of  all  these  State  debts  by  the  general  gov- 
ernment.      This  charge  was  broached  as  a  subject  of  attack  on  the 
Whigs  in  the  Senate  early  in  the  last  session.      Let  us  look  a  little 
into  facts.      I  have  said  that  the  general  government  encouraged  the 
States  to  contract  debts  by  making  the  currency  plentiful ;  but  they 
have  also  done  this  in  another  manner.  It  has  been  one  of  the  favor- 
ite projects  of  the  Administration  since  the  removal  of  the  deposits, 
to  vest  the  surplus  revenue,  and  the   increased  funds  of  the  United 
States,  in  state  bonds.    I  do  not  say  this  is  an  assumption  of  the  state 
debts,  but   1  do  say,  that  the  general  government  did  encourage  the 
states  to  issue  bonds,  and  did  endeavor  to  give  them  all  the  credit  it 
could. 

In  1836,  the  project  was  taken  up  of  distributing  the  surplus  re- 
venue among  the  states.     This  was  not,  indeed,  a  favorite  measure  of 
the   leadino-    men   of  the    Administration,   but    was  carried    rather 
against  their    wishes.     In   May  of  that  year,  it  was  moved  by  Mr. 
Wright  of  New  York,  then  and  now  a  prominent  leader   of  the  Ad- 
ministration party  in  the  Senate,  that  this  surplus  should  be  vested 
in  State  Stocks,  and  that  whenever  any  further  surplus  might  occur, 
it  should  be  vested  in  the  same  manner.     When  the  Bill  to  regulate 
the  State   Banks  was   under   consideration,  and  a  thirteenth  section 
was  proposed,  distributing  the  40,000,000  surplus  among  the  States, 
Mr.  Wright  moved  to  strike  out  that  provision,  and  to  insert  in  lieu 
of  it,  another  clause,  vesting  the  whole  of  the  money  in  State  Bonds. 
And  again,  when  the  first   Sub-Treasury  Bill  was  brought   forward, 
the   same   gentleman  tacked    on    it  a   provision,    that   the    surplus 
amounts  in  the  Treasury  should   be   vested   in  state   bonds.     And 
finally    there     were     other    sums,   which    we    held    in   trust,    from 
the     sale     of    Indian    lands    for    the     payment    of    Indian    annui- 
ties,   as  well    as   the    Smithsonian   Legacy,   which  were  also  au- 
thorized to  be  held  in  state  bonds.     I   say,  therefore,  that  so  long 
as  the  contraction  of  those  state  debts  was  favorable  to  the  admin- 
istration, they  were  the  foremost  of  all  men  in  fostering  state  cred- 
its, and  in  encouraging  the  states  to  enlarge   their  liabilities.     For 
my  associate  Mr.  Wright  declared   "  that  he  would  undertake  to 
say,  that  he  was  not  afraid  to  recommend  such  an  investment  of  the 
national  funds,  as  the  States  would  issue  as  manxj  bonds  as  the  gov- 
ernment might  choose  to  buy  !  !"     (Loud  laughter  and  cheers.) 

[At  this  point  of  the  speech,   the  wind  blowing   freshly,   and  Mr. 
Webster   having  spoken    uncovered,  some  voice  in  the  crowd  sug- 


16 

gested  that  he  shouldj  put  on  his  hat ;  but  the  courteous  orator, 
glancing  his  eye  towards  the  windows,  which  were  crowded  with  la- 
dies eagerly  listening,  playfully  replied,  "  That  I  cannot  do.  I  must 
consent  to  take  cold  now  and  then  for  the  good  of  my  country." 
The  remark  was  received  with  laughter  and  some  acclamation.] 

But  now,  after  all  this,  these  same  gentlemen,  over-reaching  the 
whole  intervening  period,  and  going  back  to  the  beginning,  reproach 
and  criminate  the  States  from  the  very  outset,  for  contracting  the  en- 
gagements to  which  the  Government  itself  incited  them.  I  do  not 
say  that  this  was  an  assumption  of  the  State  debts,  but  it  certainly 
was  holding  them  up  to  Europe  and  the  world  as  worthy  of  confi- 
dence, so  long  as  it  suited  the  purposes  of  the  Administration  so  to 
do.  And  very  pretty  purposes  it  would  have  answered  in  view  of 
the  coming  election,  had  they  succeeded  in  their  object,  and  the  Se- 
cretary of  the  Treasury  been  vested  with  unlimited  discretion  to 
purchase  state  bonds  at  his  pleasure.  Suppose  such  a  power  now 
existed,  and  Mr.  Woodbury,  conscientious  and  scrupulous  as  he  is 
known  to  be,  (loud  laughter  and  shouts)  was  asked  by  us  of  Massa- 
chusetts, for  instance,  or  had  lately  been  asked  by  our  good  sister  of 
Maine  (laughter)  to  vest  money  in  state  bonds :  how  do  you  think 
the  money  would  have  been  applied  ?  No  doubt,  it  would  have  been 
given  fieely  to  the  patriotic  states,  but  as  carefully  withheld  from 
those  not  deemed  worthy  of  that  title. 

For  this  declaration,  that  the  Whigs  in  Congress  are  in  favor  of 
the  assumption  of  the  state  debts  by  the  General  Government,  there 
exists  not  one  particle  of  proof,  nor  the  least  possible  foundation.  I 
do  not  myself  know  a  single  man  in  Congress,  who  holds  the  opi- 
nion that  the  general  government  has  any  more  right  to  pay  the 
debts  of  a  state,  than  it  has  to  pay  the  debts  of  a  private  individual. 
Congress  might  as  well  undertake  to  pay  the  debts  of  John  Jacob 
Astor,  as  of  the  state  of  New- York.  I  exempt,  however,  from  these 
remarks,  the  distribution  among  the  states  of  the  proceeds  of  the 
public  lands,  and  their  application  to  pay  the  debts  of  the  states, 
should  the  states  choose  so  to  apply  the  money.  But  I  say  there  is 
no  foundation  whatever  for  such  a  plan  of  assumption  as  Mr.  Ben- 
ton and  Mr.  Grundy  have  so  zealously  declaimed  against  in  the  U.  S. 
Senate. 

You  have  all  heard  in  the  public  papers,  (and  it  is  one  of  the  most 
despicable  of  all  the  inventions  of  the  enemy)  that  transactions 
took  place,  in  which  I  had  a  part,  the  object  of  which  was  to 
persuade  Congress  to  assume  the  state  obligations,  and  that  I  went 
to  England  for  the  worthy  purpose  of  furthering  such  a  design. 
(Laughter  and  shouting.)  Now,  as  I  am  among  you  this  day,  as 
among  my  friends,  I  will  tell  you  all  about  it.  I  left  this  country  in 
May,  1839.     At  that  time  I  had  neither  read  nor  heard  from  living 


17 

man  of  any  such  design.     I  went  to  England,  and  I  must  be  per- 
mitted to  say,  that  it  was  a  most  gloomy  time,  so   far  as  American 
securities  in  general,  and  the  state  debts  in  particular,  were  concern- 
ed.   But,  I  declare  to  you  on  my  honor,  that  no  European  banker  or 
foreign  holder  of  state  securities  ever  suggested  to  me,  in  the  remot- 
est manner,  the  least  notion  of  the  assumption  of  tlie  slate  debts  by 
the  General  Government.   Once,  indeed,  I  did  hear  the  idea  started  by 
an  American  citizen,  but  I  immediately  told  him  that  such  a  thing  was 
wholly  unconstitutional,  and  never  could  be  effected,  unless  the  people 
should  adopt  a  new  constitution.     It  was  quite  natural  that  I  should 
be  applied  to  in  reference  to  the  state  debts.    The  state  to  which  I  be- 
long had  sent  out  some  stock  to  England  to  be  sold,  and  so,  I  believe, 
had  the  state  of  New- York.  We  heard,  continually,  the  most  gloomy 
accounts  from  the  United  States,  and,  in  fact,  this  very  thing  was  to 
use  a  common  expression,  a   great  damper  to   my  enjoyment  while 
abroad.   People  frequently  applied  to  me  to  know  what  security  there 
was,  that  the  American  debts  would  be  finally  paid,  and  the  interest,  in 
the  mean  time,  regularly  discharged.   I  told  them  they  might  rely  on 
the  plighted  faith  of  the  states,  and  their  ability  to  redeem  their  ob- 
ligations.    Nobody  asked  me  whether  there  could  be  a  U.  S.   guar- 
anty to  that  effect,  nor  did  I  suggest  such  an  idea  to  any  one.      Gen- 
tlemen came  to  me  to  ask   about   the  Massachusetts  Bonds.     They 
liked  the  offer  of  five  per  cent,  interest  very  much,  as  this  was  high 
for  an  English  capitalist,  but  they  wanted  to  know  what  assurance  I 
could  give  that  the  investment  would  be  a  safe  one.     I  went  to  my 
trunk  and  took  out  an  abstract  of  the  official  return  of  the  amount  of 
the  productive  labor  of  Massachusetts.     I  put  this  into  the  hand  of 
one  of  those  inquirers,  and  told  him  to    take  it  home   and  study  it. 
He  did  so,  and  in  two  days  returned,  and  invested  forty  thousand 
pounds  sterling  in  Massachusetts  stock.  (Cheers.)  Others  came  and 
made   similar  inquiries  as  to  New- York  securities.     I  gave  them  a 
copy  of  the  very  able  and  admirable   Report  made  by  your  towns- 
man, Mr.  Ruggles,  in  1838,  and  they   came  back  satisfied.     But  to 
none  did  I  suggest,  or  in  the  remotest  manner  hint,  that  they  could 
look  to  the  United  States  to  secure  the  debt.     I  endeavored  to  up- 
hold the  credit  of  all  the   states.     I  remembered  that  they  were  all 
my  countrymen,    and  I  stated  facts  in  relation  to  each,  as  favorably 
as  truth  would  allow.      And  what  happened  then  \     Gentlemen,  it  is 
fit  that  you  should  know,  that  there  exists  a  certain  clique  in  Lon- 
don, who  are  animated  by  an  unextinguishablehateof  American  credit. 
You  may  set  it  down  as  a  fact  that  it  is  their  daily,  their  incessant, 
vocation,  to  endeavor  to  impair  the  credit  of  every  one  of  the  states, 
and  to  represent  the  purchase  of  their  bonds  as  an  unwise  and  dan- 
gerous investment  of  money.     On  this  subject  their  ferocity  knows 
no  mitigation  :  it  is  deaf  to   all  justice,  and  proof  against  all  reason 
3 


18 

The  more  you  show  them  it  is  wrong,  the  more  tenacity  of  purpose 
do  they  exhibit.  That  part  of  the  public  press  over  which  they  have 
control  is  furnished,  I  am  ashamed  to  say,  with  matter  drawn  from 
publications  which  originated  in  this  city,  and  the  object  of  which  is 
to  prove,  that  state  bonds  are  so  much  waste  paper,  the  state  having 
no  rio-ht  to  issue  any  such  obligations,  their  holders  being,  there- 
fore, utterly  destitute  of  any  security.  And  these  miserable  and 
contemptible  speculations  are  put  into  the  papers  of  the  largest  cir- 
culation in  Europe,  and  enforced  by  all  the  aid  they  can  derive  from 
editorial  sanction.  It  was  under  circumstances  like  these  that  a 
large  Banking  House  in  London  put  to  me  as  a  Lawyer,  the  profes- 
sional question,  whether  the  States  were  empowered  to  issue  evi- 
dences of  debt  payable  by  the  state.  I  answered  that,  for  this  purpose, 
they  were  as  completely  sovereign  as  any  State  in  Europe ;  that  they 
had  a  Public  Faith  to  pledge,  and  did  pledge  it.  This  entire  corres- 
pondence was  published — (though  you  might  as  well  get  any  Admi- 
nistration Editor  in  this  country  to  take  hold  of  a  pair  of  hot  tongs 
as  to  insert  it  in  his  columns) — in  the  face  of  those  who  have  been 
shouting  in  all  quarters,  that  I  had  a  personal  agency  in  bringing 
about  an  assumption  of  state  debts  by  the  General  Government. 

It  so  happened,  that  in  the  latter  part  of  October,  the  house  of  Ba- 
rings issued  a  Circular  to  foreign  houses  on  this  subject,  which  Cir- 
cular I  never  saw  till  I  arrived  in  America.  In  this  paper  they  speak 
of  such  an  assumption  or  guaranty,  but  as  it  went  to  foreign  houses, 
I  never  saw,  nor  did  I  hear  of  it  till  last  December,  when  I  heard  at 
the  same  time  of  the  proceedings  of  Mr.  Benton.  But  I  here  wish 
again  to  repeat,  that  during  the  whole  time  I  was  in  Europe,  no 
English  banker  or  foreign  bond-holder  ever  suggested  an  idea  of 
such  an  assumption.  The  first  I  heard  of  it  was  from  an  American 
citizen  there,  and  not  again  till  my  return  to  this  country. 
I  have  said,  that  owing  to  the  bad  news  which  was  constantly 
received  from  this  country,  the  pleasure  of  my  visit  was  much 
diminished.  I  will  now  say,  that  during  the  whole  time  of  my 
absence,  I  had  the  lowest  hopes,  as  to  the  political  state  of  the  coun- 
try, which  I  ever  indulged.  I  saw  the  fatal  workings  of  the  experi- 
ment, and  I  saw  that  nothing  wiser  or  better  was  in  the  mind  of  the 
Administration.  And  though  I  knew  that  a  vast  majority  of  my 
countrymen  were  opposed  to  the  existing  policy,  yet  I  did  not  see 
them  sufficiently  roused,  nor  had  I  confidence  that  they  would  ever 
come  to  that  cordial  union  in  relation  to  any  one  candidate  for  the 
Presidency,  which  would  enable  them,  as  a  party,  to  take  the  field 
with  any  rational  hope  of  success,     (cheers.) 

Such  were  the  gloomy  feelings  which  possessed  my  mind,  when  I 
first  learned  the  result  of  the  Harrisburgh  Convention.  (Shouts  and 
cheers.)     But,  when  I  saw  a  nomination  which,  though  unwelcome  at 


19 

first  to  many,  I  thought  the  best  that  could  possibly  have  been  made, 
and  learned  that  it  was  fast  gaining  the  approbation  of  all  who  thought 
with  me  ;  and  above  all,  when  I  beheld  the  warm  enthusiasm  and  the 
heartfelt  union  which  soon  animated  their  ranks,  and  concentrated 
their  movements,  I  then  began  to  entertain  a  confidence  that  the  hour 
of  deliverance  was  at  hand,  and  that  my  long-suffering  country  would 
yet  relieve  herself  from  the  disastrous  condition  to  which  she  had 
been  reduced.     (Loud  and  long  cheering.) 

After  a  brief  pause,  Mr.  Webster  said,  I  hope,  gentlemen,  you  will 
not  be  alarmed,  if  I  take  from  my  notes  one  more  paper,  (loud  cries 
of  "  go  on" — "  go  on"  "  we  can  hear  you  an  hour  yet" — '•  speak  on  till 
sun-down,")  I  will  detain  you  but  a  few  moments  in  briefly  express- 
ing the  opinions  I  entertain  in  regard  to  the  Sub-Treasury.  It  ap- 
pears to  me  to  be  a  scheme  entirely  new  to  our  history,  and  foreign 
to  our  habits,  and  to  be  the  last  of  a  series  of  baffled  experiments, 
into  which  the  representatives  of  the  people  have  been  lashed  and 
fatigued  by  the  continued  exercise  of  executive  power,  through  four 
mortal  sessions  of  Congress. 

I  will  say  a  word  or  two  in  relation  to  the  system  under  the  vari- 
ous aspects  in  which  its  friends  have  supported  it.  What  are  the 
arguments  in  its  favor  1  The  leading  argument  was  that  of  safety 
to  the  Government.  This  was  a  plan  to  keep  the  Public  money 
where  rogues  could  not  run  away  with  it.  Now  I  think  there  is  a 
way  to  prevent  that,  which  would  be  much  more  effectual,  and  that  is 
not  to  trust  rogues  with  the  keeping  of  the  public  money.  (Laughter.) 
But  as  to  the  notion  of  better  vaults,  and  more  secure,  is  it  not  the  most 
ridiculous  of  all  humbugs  1  I  do  not  know  in  which  of  the  bank 
vaults  around  me  the  Receiver  General  keeps  his  funds.  If  they  are 
in  a  vault  different  from  that  which  belongs  to  the  bank,  I  will  ven- 
ture to  say  it  is  no  better  and  no  safer.  It  is  said,  however,  that  by 
this  means  government  is  to  keep  its  own  money.  What  does  this 
mean  1  Who  is  that  government  1  Who  is  that  individual  "  I," 
who  is  to  keep  our  money  in  his  own  pocket  1  Is  not  government 
a  mere  collection  of  agencies  1  Is  not  every  dollar  it  possesses  in 
trust  with  somebody  ?  It  may  be  put  in  vaults  under  a  key,  but 
the  key  is  given  to  somebody  to  keep.  Government  is  not  a  person 
with  pockets. 

The  only  question  is,  whether  the  government  agents  under  the 
sub- treasury  are  any  safer  than  the  government  agents  before  it  was 
adopted  1  Mr.  Wright,  indeed,  has  assured  us,  that  the  agents  under 
the  sub-treasury  are  made  responsible  to  the  people.  But  howl  in 
what  respect  ?  The  Receiver  General  gives  bonds,  but  how  is  he 
more  responsible  on  that  account  than  the  Collector  in  another 
street,  who,  like  him,  receives  the  public  money,  and  like  him  gives 
bonds  for  its  safe  keeping  ?      It    is  just  the  same   thing.      One  o( 


20 

these  officers  is  just  as  far  from  the  people,  and  just  as  near  to  the 
people,  as  the  other.  How  then  is  the  Receiver  General  more  di- 
rectly responsible  1  There  is  not  a  particle  of  truth  or  reason  in  the 
whole  matter.  If  the  vaults  are  not  better,  is  the  security  better  % 
I  have  no  manner  of  doubt  that  the  Receiver  General  in  this  city  is 
a  highly  respectable  man,  but  where  is  the  proof  that  the  govern, 
ment  money  is  any  safer  in  his  vault  than  in  the  bank  where  he  has 
his  office  1  Suppose  Mr.  Allen  had  a  private  office  of  his  own  at  a 
distance  from  the  bank,  and  should  give  the  same  bonds  he  now 
does,  for  the  safe  keeping  of  all  moneys  intrusted  to  him,  how  many 
of  you  would  deposit  your  private  funds  in  his  office,  rather  than  in 
a  bank  having  half  a  million  or  a  million  of  dollars  capital,  under  the 
government  of  directors  whose  own  fortunes  were  deposited  in  its 
vaults  ?  Try  the  experiment,  and  see  how  many  would  resort  to 
Mr.  Allen,  and  how  many  to  the  Banks. 

So  far  from  being  safer,  I  maintain  on  the  contrary  that  this  Sub- 
Treasury  scheme  jeopards  the  public  money,  because  it  multiplies 
the  hands  through  which  it  is  to  pass,  and  thereby  multiplies  the  chan- 
ces of  corruption,  or  of  loss.  Your  Collector,  Mr.  Hoyt,  receives  the 
money  on  duty  bonds.  He  holds  it  subject  to  the  draft  or  order  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  or  else  is  to  pay  it  over  to  Mr.  Allen.  If  Mr. 
Hoyt  were  dishonest,  might  he  not  have  shared  the  money  before 
the  Receiver  General  could  get  at  it  %  The  scheme  doubles  the 
chances  of  loss  by  doubling  the  hands  which  are  to  keep  the  money. 

But  this  scheme  is  to  encourage  the  circulation  of  specie  !  I  cer- 
tainly shall  not  detain  you  on  a  matter  with  which  you  are  more  fa- 
miliar than  I  am  ;  but  let  me  ask  you  a  few  questions.  By  one  clause 
of  the  Sub-Treasury  Law,  one-fourth  of  all  the  duties  bonded  is  to  be 
paid  in  specie,  and  the  residue  according  to  the  resolution  of  1816. 
Now  I  want  to  know  one  thing :  if  one  of  you  has  a  Custom 
House  Bond  to  pay,  you  go  to  the  Collector  with  a  certified  check 
purporting  to  be  payable  in  specie,  for  one-fourth  of  the  amount,  and 
another  check,  in  common  form,  for  the  other  three-fourths.  Does 
not  the  Collector  receive  these  checks  ]  That  is  the  question  I  ask 
you.  (Loud  cries  of  "  Yes,  Yes — he  does — he  does.'!)  Well, 
then  is  not  all  that  part  of  the  law,  which  requires  the  payment  of 
one-fourth  in  specie  a  mere  sham  1  (Cries  of  "Yes,"  "Yes," 
"Sham!"  "Sham!"  "  Humbug!")  If  you  go  to  him  with  a  draft, 
and  demand  specie,  he  will  no  doubt  give  it  to  you  if  you  request 
it,  but  if  not,  he  gives  you  good  notes.  Where  then  is  all  this 
marching  and  countermarching  of  specie,  which  was  to  glad- 
den our  eyes  1  Is  it  not  all  humbug  ?  (Loud  cheers  and  shouting.) 
What  does  the  Collector  do  with  the  money  when  he  gets  it  1  Does 
lie  not  deposit  it  in  a  bank  of  a  very  unsavory  name  ?  1  do  not  cer- 
tainly know,  but  I  believe  he  deposits  it  in  the  Bank  of  the  United 


21 

States.  He  afterwards  pays  it  over  to  the  Receiver  General,  and 
gives  him  all  the  specie  he  wants  ;  and  yet,  after  all,  there  is  no 
general  use  of  specie  in  the  matter. 

They  speak  about  a  divorce  between  bank  and  state  ;  and  what 
does  it  amount  to  1  I  ask  you,  is  not  the  great  amount  of  Govern- 
ment funds  at  this  moment  in  safe  keeping  in  some  bank  1  I  believe 
it  is.  Then  there  is  no  separation.  The  Government  gives  the 
money  to  individuals  to  keep,  and  they,  like  sensible  men,  put  it  into 
bank.  Is  this  separation?  If  any  change  is  made  in  the  connection 
it  is  to  render  it  more  close,  and  like  other  illicit  connections,  the 
closer  it  is,  the  more  secret  it  is  kept. 

It  is  called  the  "  Independent  Treasury,"  and  some  of  its  friends 
have  called  it  "  a  second  declaration  of  independence."  Indepen- 
dence !  how'?  of  what  1  It  is  dependent  on  individuals,  who  imme- 
diately go  to  the  bank  ;  and  is  it  to  be  tolerated  that  there  should 
be  this  outcry  about  the  use  of  specie,  when  here,  you,  in  the  heart 
of  the  commercial  community,  see  and  know  that  there  is  no  such 
thing? 

But  though  at  present  this  is  all  sham,  yet  that  power  to  demand 
specie,  which  the  Law  contains,  when  its  requirements   shall  cover 
the  whole  revenue  of  the  government,  and  when  that  revenue  shall 
be  large,   may,   in   its  exercise,  become  a   most   dangerous  instru- 
ment. When  government  shall  have,  in  the  banks  of  this  city,  twelve 
to  fifteen  millions  of  dollars  on  deposit,   as    it  has  had,  it  will  be 
in  the  power  of  the  government  to  break  down  at  its  pleasure  one,  if 
not  all  of  these  institutions.     And  when  you  go  to  the  West,  where 
the    money  is    received  for  the  Public  Lands,  every  specie    paying 
bank  in  the  country  may,  at  the  mere  pleasure  of  the  government,  be 
compelled  to  shut  up  its  doors. — But  this  Independent  Treasury  is  to 
be  independent  of  the  banks  !   Well,  if  the  Sub-Treasury  Law  is  to  be 
called  the  second  Declaration  of  Independence,  then  there  is  a  third 
Declaration  of  Independence,  and  that  is  the  Treasury  Note  law.  How 
marvellously  free  does  that  make  us  of  banks !    While  two  millions 
of  these  notes  bearing  interest  are   deposited  there, — and  there, — 
and  there, — in  all  these  banks  around  me  !     Deposited  1     How  de- 
posited 1     They  are  sold — and  how  sold  ?     They   are   deposited  in 
these  banks  carrying  interest,  while  the  bank  gives  the  government 
authority  to  draw  for  money  as  it  shall  need.     Now  I  say  the  bank 
may  make,  not  a  very  unreasonable,  but  a  very  reasonable  amount 
by  the   interest  in  tbese  notes,  before  it  is   called  on  to  pay  out 
any   of   its  own  money.     One  of  these  accounts  between  bank  and 
Government  was  examined  by  a  friend  of  mine  :    I   had  not  my- 
self time  to  look  at  it.     The   bank  received  Treasury  notes  bear- 
ing interest :  it  passed  these  to  the  credit    of  Government,  at    the 
nominal  amount :  the  Government  was  then  to  draw  for  money  as 


22 

it  wanted  it ;  and,  on  that  single  transaction,  the  bank  realized  be- 
tween eighty  and  a  hundred  thousand  dollars  in  interest.  Now  this 
is  what  I  call  a  third  Declaration  of  Independence  !  (Laughter  and 
cheers.)  You  know  by  the  Secretary's  Report,  that  the  Govern- 
ment has  already  issued  nearly  the  whole  of  the  five  millions  au- 
thorized by  Congress.  Two  millions  lie  in  the  banks  drawing  in- 
terest, the  banks  paying  Government  drafts  as  they  come  in.  And 
this  is  setting  up  for  independence  of  the  banks  ! 

Again,  the  fashion  now  is,  since  Mr.  Calhoun  has  forced  the 
Administration  to  insert  in  the  Law  the  specie  clause,  for  Gov- 
ernment to  discredit  the  use  of  bank  paper  whenever  it  can.  That 
is  the  general  tone  of  the  government  communications.  They  avow 
such  to  be  their  object,  and  I  believe  them.  But  who  can  tell  the 
consequence  of  discrediting  bank  paper,  if  our  revenues  should  ever 
again  become  what  they  have  been  in  times  past  ?  It  is  a  power 
by  which  government  can  break  the  solvent  banks,  but  can  never 
make  the  insolvent  return  to  their  duty. 

But  then  it  is  said,  all  this  cannot  be  any  great  matter,  because  Mr. 
Wright  tells  us,  that  in  ordinary  times,  five  millions  of  dollars  will 
perform  all  the  operations  of  receipt  and  expenditure.  Now,  that 
proposition  depends  upon  Mr.  Wright's  estimate  of  what  the  expen- 
diture will  be.  Does  he  expect  to  reduce  it  to  the  standard  of  Mr. 
Adams's  administration,  once  denounced  as  so  extravagant  1  Does 
he  expect  to  reduce  the  thirty-nine  millions  to  thirteen  millions  ?  or 
will  he  go  below  that  1  He  does  not  tell  us.  For  my  own  part,  I 
believe,  five,  or  five  and  a  half  millions  would  be  a  moiety  of  the 
average  amount  of  specie  in  all  the  banks  in  the  city.  You  can 
judge  for  yourselves  what  must  be  the  effect  of  withdrawing  one 
half  of  all  the  specie  in  these  banks,  and  of  locking  it  up  in  the  Sub- 
Treasury  vaults. 

But  how  does  all  this  stand  with  Mr.  Wright's  main  argument  ? 
He  says  that  the  great  object  to  be  effected  by  the  Sub-Treasury 
law,  is  to  prevent  fluctuations  by  preventing  the  banks  from  dis- 
counting upon  the  public  money ;  but  if  five  millions  of  dollars 
only  are  needed  for  the  ordinary  treasury  operations,  can  such  a 
sum  as  this  have  produced  all  the  fluctuations  in  the  commercial 
community  1  Surely  not.  In  his  printed  speech  he  says,  that  the 
chief  practical  difference  produced  by  the  law  is,  that  the  money  is 
now  kept  by  Mr.  Allen,  which  used  to  be  kept  by  the  Bank  of 
America.  But  is  that  all  1  What,  then,  becomes  of  the  specie  clause  % 
I  suppose  he  knows  that  was  all  a  sham. 

Gentlemen,  I  will  not  detain  you  longer  on  the  practical  operation 
of  this  sub-treasury  scheme.  So  far  as  relates  to  the  receipts  and 
disbursements  of  the  public  treasure,  you  know  better  than  I.  A 
great  part  of  these  operations  take  place  in  your  own  city.  But  per- 
mit me  now  to  go  for  a  moment   into  the  political  objection  to  this 


■2i 

sub-treasury  scheme  :  I  mean  its  utter  omission  of  all  concern  with 
the  general  currency  of  the  country.  This  objection  is  cardinal  and 
decisive.  It  is  this  which  has  roused  the  country,  and  which  is  to 
decide  the  fate  of  the  present  Administration.  But  the  question  is 
so  general,  it  has  so  long  been  before  the  country,  and  so  frequently 
discussed  in  all  quarters,  that  I  will  not  further  extend  my  remarks 
in  regard  to  it.  I  believe  that  the  mind  of  the  people  is  now 
thoroughly  awakened,  and  that  the  day  rapidly  approaches  when 
their  final  judgment  will  be  pronounced. 

There  is  yet  one  topic  on  which  I  must  detain  you  for  only  a  mo- 
ment, and  I  will  then  relieve  you.  We  have  th^s  good  fortune,  under 
the   blessing   of  a  benign   Providence,  to  live  in  a  country  which 
we  are  proud  of  for  many  things — for  its  independence,  for  its  pub- 
lic liberty,  for  its   free    institutions,  for  its  public   spirit,  for  its  en- 
lightened patriotism ;  but  we  are  proud  also — and  it  is  among  those 
things  we  should  be  the  most  proud  of, — we  are  proud  of  its  public 
justice,  of  its  sound  faith,  of  its  substantially  correct  morals  in  the 
administration  of  the  government,  and  the   general  conduct  of  the 
country,  since   she  took  her  place  among  the  nations  of  the  world. 
But  among  the  events  which  most  threaten  our  character  and  stand- 
ing, and  which  so  grossly  attach  on  these  moral  principles  that  have 
hitherto  distinguished  us,  are   certain   sentiments  which   have  been 
broached  among  us,  and  I  am  sorry  to  say,  have  more  supporters  than 
they    ought,  because    they    strike    at   the    very    foundation  of   the 
social  system.      I  do   not  speak    especially  of  those    which   have 
been  promulgated  by  some  person  in  my  own  State,  but  of  others 
which  go   yet    deeper   into    our    political    condition.     I   refer   to 
the  doctrine  that  one  generation  of  men  acting  under  the  Constitu- 
tion,  cannot  bind  another  generation  who  are  to  be  their  successors  ; 
on  which   ground  it  is  held,  among  other  things,  that  state  bonds 
are  not  obligatory.     What  1  one  generation  cannot    bind  another  1 
Where  is  the  line  of  separation  1     It  changes  hourly.     The  Ame- 
rican community  to-day  is  not  the  same  with  the  American  commu- 
nity to-morrow.      The  community  in  which  I  began  this  day  to  ad- 
dress you,  is  not  the  same  as  it  is  at  this  moment. 

How  abhorrent  is  such  a  doctrine  to  those  great  truths,  which 
teach  us  that  though  individuals  nourish  and  decay,  states  are  im- 
mortal; that  political  communities  are  ever  young,  evergreen,  ever 
flourishing,  ever  identical.  The  individuals  who  compose  them  may 
change,  as  the  atoms  of  our  bodies  change,  but  the  political  com- 
munity still  exists  in  its  aggregate  capacity,  as  do  our  bodies  in  their 
natural ;  with  this  only  difference,  that  we  know  that  our  natural 
frames  must  soon  dissolve,  and  return  to  their  original  dust ;  but,  for 
our  country,  she  yet  lives — she  ever  dwells  on  our  hearts,  and  it 
will  even  at  that  solemn  moment,  go  up  as  our  last  aspiration  to 
Heaven,  that  she  may  be  immortal. 


tt\ 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA   LIBRARY 

Los  Angeles 

OFFICERS  OF  THE  MEETING. 


V 


The  foregoing  Spee^5fc|*yas  made  at  a  Meeting,  held  in  pursuance 
of  a  call,  of  "  the  Merchants  and  Traders  of  the  city  of  New  York, 
who  disapprove  of  the  leading  measures  of  the  Administration,  and 
are  opposed  to  the  re-election  of  Martin  Van  Buren,  and  in  favor  of 
the  election  of  Harrison  and  Tyler,"  in  front  of  the  Merchants'  Ex- 
change, Wall  street,  on  Monday,  September  28,  1840.  The  follow- 
ing gentlemen,  on  nomination  of  Wm.  W.  Todd,  were  appointed  offi- 
cers of  the  meeting. 

President, 
JONATHAN   GOODHUE. 


Benjamin  Strong, 
James  Brown, 
Edward  G.  Faile, 
David  Lee, 
Jonathan  Sturges, 
Stephen  Whitney, 
James  G.  King, 
John  Haggerty, 
G.  P.  D  is  o  sway, 
Charles  H.  Russell, 
John  W.  Harris, 
John  D.  Wolfe, 
John  Rathbone,  Jr. 

Wm.  H.  Aspinwall, 
Augustin  Averill, 


Vice  Presidents, 

William  Scott, 
Hugh  Auchincloss, 
James  J.  Van  Alen, 
D.  A.  Cushman, 
Thomas  Brooks, 
D.  W.  C.  Olyphant, 
John  P.  Stagg-, 
John  A.  Underwood, 
Henry  K.  Bogert, 
R.  H.  Nevins, 
Peter  I.  Nevius, 
John  Van  Nostrand, 
Abraham  Fardon. 

Secretaries, 

Thomas  Williams,  Jr., 
John  Steward,  Jr., 
E.  P.  Heyer. 


Ljaulord         • 

PAMPHLET  BINDER 

^ZZ   Syrocoie,  N.  Y. 
Stockton,  Calif. 


HG    521.        W3S2W 


I 


JC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


AA    000  590  450    3 


